Edge Atmos · Engineering Reference

Drone Neutralisation
Methodology

A complete model for electromagnetic and directed-energy effects on hostile UAS platforms — from first sensor event to terminal state. Physics, state transitions, wave behavior modulation, escape logic, and worked scenarios sourced from the EDGE Atmos BRD.

15
Threat drones
6
Drone states
5
Wave behaviors
9
EW wave families
S ≥ 16
Neutralisation threshold
10 Hz
Tick rate
Detection to response

The Operational Pipeline

Every hostile drone moves through a six-stage chain. Intel AI owns stages 1–4 — evidence to classification. Strike AI owns 4–6 — planning to execution. Neutralisation occurs inside Task execution.

OB-
Observation
Raw sensor / SITREP
→Correlate
TR-
Trace
Movement track
→Fuse
IN-
Intel
Classified entity
→Elevate
T-
Threat
→ Strike AI
→Plan
M-
Mission
Response plan
→Dispatch
TK-
Task
Operator instruction
Intel AI owns
Observation → Trace → Intel → Threat
Sensemaking · Correlation · Classification · Elevation
Strike AI owns
Threat → Mission → Task
Planning · Asset selection · Dispatch · Monitoring
The effect model

Physics of Neutralisation

Six steps run every tick (10 Hz) per active drone-wave pair. I_eff_tick is produced by the EW Wave engine. Steps 2–6 are the neutralisation model's responsibility.

Step 1 — Behavior modulation
I_eff_tick = I_eff_base × B(t)
B(t) modulates base intensity per wave behavior every tick. STATIC = 1.0. PULSE = 0 during off-phase. SWEEP = varies as beam rotates past drone. HOLD ≈ 1.0 (emitter tracks). MOVING = 1.0 but R changes each tick.
Step 2 — Distance attenuation
I(R) = P_peak / (1 + (R / R₀)^α)
α = 2.0 for RF (inverse square), 3.0 for DEW. R₀ = 50 m. R and G(θ,φ) recomputed every tick from current drone position. Never cached between ticks.
Step 3 — Directional gain
G(θ,φ) = cosⁿ(θ_offset) × cosᵐ(φ_offset)
Offset from beam centerline. In HOLD mode the emitter tracks the drone so G stays near maximum regardless of drone movement. Off-axis evasion does not work against HOLD.
Step 4 — Effective intensity
I_eff_base = I(R) × G × F_match × F_los × F_weather
F_match = 0 for SATCOM drones against ground RF jammers. F_los: RF floor 0.05, DEW hard-stops at terrain. F_weather = 1.0 default in Phase 1.
Step 5 — Exposure accumulation
E(t+dt) = E(t) + I_eff_tick × dt
E is permanent — never decays, never resets on field exit or between missions. A drone at E = 12 before escaping resumes its next engagement from E = 12. Off-phase ticks add nothing. State does not reverse.
Step 6 — Neutralisation score
S = (E × V_em) / Resist
Resist = M_mat × (1−V_em) × (1+0.01v) × (1+0.001alt)
S recomputed every tick. Can only increase. V_em = 0.94 (generic hex) to 0.15 (Akinci) per BRD. Resist floor = 0.01 to prevent divide-by-zero when V_em = 1.0.
Drone lifecycle

State Machine

Six states. Five are one-way S-threshold transitions — exposure is permanent so S can only increase. Escaped is the only two-way state. Re-entry resumes immediately at the S-correct state.

01
Detected
S < 1
Inside wave volume. Exposure accumulating. No functional degradation.
02
Engaged
1 ≤ S < 8
Active interference. C2 degrading. Minor erratic movement.
03
Degraded
8 ≤ S < 12
Measurable loss. GNSS drifting. Video artefacts. C2 intermittent.
04
Disrupted
12 ≤ S < 16
Navigation failure. RF link failing. Fail-safe may trigger.
05
Neutralised
S ≥ 16
Total C2 loss. Firmware: land, hover, or uncontrolled crash.
06
Escaped
S < 16, exits field
E and S frozen. Two-way state — resumable on re-entry.
Neutralised — firmware outcomes
GNSS available: Hover and descend at current position.

RTH + GNSS disrupted: Return-to-home fails — drone drifts uncontrolled.

Both C2 and GNSS lost: Uncontrolled descent. May crash.

Inertial-only platforms: Continue on last heading — must be re-engaged.
Escaped — re-entry rules
E and S frozen at exit. Never reset between engagements.

On re-entry: drone jumps immediately to the S-correct state. A drone at S = 14 re-entering → DISRUPTED instantly.

Strike AI uses current S when planning re-engagement — recommends closer or higher-powered assets.

AAR records: S_at_escape, E_at_escape, time_in_field, re_entry_count.
How waves change over time

Wave Behaviors & B(t)

B(t) multiplies I_eff_base every tick. Without it, a pulsing dome, a sweeping sector jammer, and a held gun lock look identical to the accumulation model — which is wrong.

Static
B(t) = 1.0 — constant
Field fixed in space. I_eff_base varies only as the drone moves — changing R and G(θ,φ) each tick. Never cache I_eff_base. Evasion works — flying off-axis reduces G.
RF_OMNI dome · GNSS Denial Node · Fixed sector
Hold
B(t) = Q_hold(t) — 0.85 to 1.0
Emitter actively tracks the drone. Heading updates every tick. G stays near maximum regardless of drone movement. Most damaging single-target behavior — evasion does not work.
RF_DIRECTIONAL gun · DEW_BEAM laser
Pulse
B(t) = pulse_envelope(t) — 0 or 1
Alternates on/off-phase. During off-phase: B(t) = 0, no accumulation, state machine frozen but not reversed. Time to neutralise ≈ continuous ÷ duty_cycle.
RF_OMNI pulse · HPM_PULSE emitter
Sweep
B(t) = cosⁿ(θ_beam(t) − θ_drone)
Beam rotates across sector at defined rate. Drone gets near-full intensity only when beam points at it. Between sweeps B(t) falls to sidelobe — low but not zero.
RF_SECTOR sweep · Saksham C-UAS Grid (CD 3)
Moving
B(t) = 1.0 — R(t) = |asset_pos(t) − drone|
Emitter follows mobile asset. R changes every tick as platform moves. Volume membership re-evaluated every tick — convoy driving away can trigger ESCAPED with no drone movement.
Mobile Escort Jammer · Vehicle Protection Node
Static
Field exists in space. Drone moves through it.

Moving off-axis reduces G(θ,φ). Flying away increases R and reduces I(R).

Evasion works. The drone reduces exposure by flying off-axis or away from the emitter.
Hold
Field follows the drone. Emitter heading updates each tick. G stays near maximum.

Only increasing R (flying away from emitter) reduces I_eff. Off-axis manoeuvres are tracked.

Evasion does not work. Q_hold degrades only slightly with active evasion.
Electromagnetic effect families

EW Wave Families

Nine counter-drone wave families. F_match determines whether the wave has any effect — SATCOM drones (TB2, CH-4B, Wing Loong II, Akinci) have F_match = 0 against all ground-based RF jammers.

RF_DIRECTIONAL
Cone · Centerline · Hold
Handheld or turreted gun. Narrow beam tracks target. CD 4 Paras, CD 5 DRDO/BEL, CD 13 SAMSAR.
Phase 1
RF_SECTOR
Sector · Layered · Sweep
Wide corridor denial. CD 3 Saksham C-UAS Grid — 360° sector SWEEP mode.
Phase 1
RF_OMNI
Hemisphere · Layered · Pulse
360° denial dome. CD 2 Indrajaal — pulsing omni with acoustic sensors.
Phase 1
GNSS_DENIAL
Hemisphere/Cone · Radial · Static
Navigation denial. F_match = 0 for Shahed-136 (inertial primary — no active GNSS dependency).
Phase 1
C2_DENIAL
Inherited · Inherited · Inherited
Command-link suppression. Component of parent jammer. Not a standalone wave.
Phase 1
VIDEO_DENIAL
Inherited · Inherited · Inherited
Payload downlink suppression. Blinds recon drone EO/IR feed.
Phase 1
RF_COMPOSITE
Hemisphere · Layered · Static/Hold
Multi-band simultaneous. CD 1 D4S, CD 12 ASHWA, CD 14 BEL LSTAR — 360° integrated C-UAS.
Phase 2
HPM_PULSE
Cone · Centerline · Pulse
High-power microwave burst. Electronics overload. Short dwell, very high peak power.
Phase 2
DEW_BEAM
Beam · Centerline · Hold
Directed-energy laser. F_match = 1.0 for all drones. CD 7 DRDO DEW Mk-II (10 kW), CD 8 Adani–DRDO (15 kW).
Phase 2
BRD ID · Drone
V_em
Comm link / Nav
RF jamming?
TO 10 — Generic hexacopters
0.94
Commercial RF · GPS only
Yes — easiest to neutralise
TO 1 — DJI Mavic 3
0.92
OcuSync 3.0 · 2.4/5.8 GHz · GPS/GLONASS/Galileo/BeiDou
Yes — full effect. ~0.18 s at 300 m
TO 3 — Parrot Anafi USA
0.82
Encrypted Wi-Fi · GPS/GLONASS
Yes — full effect
TO 14 — Supercam S-250
0.72
Encrypted RF · GPS/GLONASS
Yes — standard engagement
TO 2 — DJI Matrice 300 RTK
0.68
OcuSync 3.0 · GPS/GLONASS/BeiDou/RTK · Mg alloy (M_mat 1.8)
Yes — sustained jamming required
TO 8 — Asisguard Songar
0.55
Encrypted RF · GPS/Barometric
Partial — DEW follow-up advised
TO 9 — Byker Yiha
0.42
Encrypted RF · GPS/INS
Partial — drone intercept recommended
TO 4 — Switchblade 300
0.38
Encrypted FHSS · GPS/INS · 46 m/s max speed
Low — DEW or drone intercept needed
TO 5 — Shahed-136
0.28
Pre-programmed waypoints — no active RF link · INS primary
No — CD 10 Bhargavastra kinetic C-RAM
TO 15 — Burraq (NESCOM)
0.25
Encrypted RF · GPS/INS · military-grade
No — DRDO DEW Mk-II or intercept
TO 6 — Bayraktar TB2
0.22
Encrypted SATCOM + LOS · GPS/GLONASS/INS
No — SATCOM defeats RF. F_match = 0
TO 7 — CH-4B (CASC)
0.20
Encrypted SATCOM · GPS/GLONASS/INS
No — SATCOM. DEW required
TO 12 — Caihong CH-4
0.20
Encrypted SATCOM · GPS/GLONASS/INS
No — SATCOM. DEW required
TO 11 — Wing Loong II
0.18
Encrypted SATCOM · 4,200 kg MALE UCAV
No — Heron TP intercept only option
TO 13 — Bayraktar Akinci
0.15
Encrypted SATCOM · HALE at 12,000 m
No — out of C-UAS envelope entirely
Combined effects

Multi-Wave Interaction

When a drone is inside two or more wave volumes, effective intensities combine with diminishing returns — not simple addition. Total can never exceed I_max (strongest single asset at point-blank).

Diminishing returns formula
I_eff_combined = I_max × (1 − Π(1 − I_eff_i / I_max))
I_max = strongest single-source at point-blank. Π = product across all N overlapping waves. Apply before the exposure accumulation step every tick. Two waves at 0.60 and 0.50 combine to 0.774 — not 1.10. A third wave adds only 0.048 more.
Worked example — TO 1: DJI Mavic 3 · I_max = 0.92
CD 3 Saksham C-UAS Grid
0.60
Wave 1 alone → 0.60
GNSS Denial Node
0.50
Simple sum = 1.10 ✗
Combined (formula)
0.774
0.92 × (1−0.348×0.457) ✓
1 WAVE
0.600
baseline
2 WAVES
0.774
+0.174 incremental
3 WAVES
0.822
+0.048 incremental
HARD CAP
0.920
I_max — never exceeded
Interactive

Engagement Simulator

Select a threat drone and a counter-drone asset, then set engagement parameters. The simulator computes I_eff, exposure accumulation rate, time to neutralise, and the resulting S-score and state.

Threat Drone
Counter-Drone Asset
S = (E × V_em) / Resist · Resist = M_mat × (1−V_em) × (1+0.01·speed) × (1+0.001·altitude) · I_eff = P_peak / (1 + (R/R₀)²) × G × F_match
Drone parameters
V_em (EM vulnerability)
M_mat (material)
Speed (m/s)
Altitude (m)
Counter-drone parameters
Peak power P (W)
Range R (m)
F_match (0–1)
F_los (0–1)
B(t) duty factor (0–1)
Results
I_eff per tick
—
W · at given range
Resist
—
higher = harder
Time to Neutralise (S ≥ 16)
—
Engagement duration (seconds)
5 s
Exposure E at this duration
—
—
—
Score S at duration
Engagement assessment
Select a threat drone and counter-drone asset to see the engagement assessment.
Developer test cases

Scenario Playbook

Eleven end-to-end scenarios with BRD-sourced drone and asset IDs. Covers all five wave behaviors, immune targets, escape and re-entry, multi-wave, and DEW.

#
Scenario
BRD assets & conditions
Outcome
01
Standard RF Kill
Static · Point target
TO 1: DJI Mavic 3 (V_em 0.92) · CD 5: DRDO/BEL Anti-Drone Gun 500 W · 300 m · Hovering 140 m
Neutralised 0.18 s
02
Escape — Transit
Static · Fast transit
TO 4: Switchblade 300 (V_em 0.38) · CD 3: Saksham C-UAS Grid SWEEP · 1,200 m · 46 m/s · barely DETECTED at exit
Escaped S < 1
03
Re-Engagement
Permanent exposure
TO 4: Switchblade 300 · CD 5: Anti-Drone Gun · 150 m · Prior E = 4.66 from earlier engagement
Neutralised 3.59 s
04
RF-Immune Target
Pre-condition fail
TO 6: Bayraktar TB2 (V_em 0.22) · Any RF jammer · Encrypted SATCOM → F_match = 0. CD 7: DRDO DEW Mk-II required.
No RF effect
05
DEW Kill
Hold · Dwell model
TO 1: DJI Mavic 3 · CD 7: DRDO Laser DEW Mk-II (10,000 W) · 800 m · Q_track = 0.95 · D_eff ≥ 50 at 63 s
Physical kill 63 s
06
Multi-Wave
Diminishing returns
TO 1: Mavic 3 · CD 3: Saksham SWEEP (0.60) + GNSS Denial (0.50) · Combined = 0.774 not 1.10
Neutralised 1.1 s
07
GNSS-Immune
Nav pre-condition fail
TO 5: Shahed-136 (V_em 0.28) · Any GNSS jammer · Inertial primary nav → F_match = 0. CD 10: Bhargavastra kinetic required.
No GNSS effect
08
Partial Disruption
Sector edge · Escape
TO 2: Matrice 300 (V_em 0.68) · CD 1: D4S C-UAS System · 800 m sector edge · 12 s in field
Escaped S = 9.0
09
Pulse Behavior
50% duty cycle
TO 1: Mavic 3 · CD 2: Indrajaal PULSE dome · T = 2 s · duty = 0.50 · off-phase state frozen, not regressed
Neutralised 0.18 s on-phase
10
Sweep Behavior
B(t) varies per tick
TO 1: Mavic 3 · CD 3: Saksham SWEEP · 30° off-center · T = 4 s · sidelobe between crossings non-zero
Neutralised 0.5 s
11
Moving Behavior
Convoy drives away
TO 1: Mavic 3 · Mobile Escort Jammer (RF_OMNI MOVING) · Asset moves at 15 m/s · R(t) recalculated every tick
Neutralised (close range)
Implementation constraints

Key Rules

Non-negotiable constraints for every implementation of this model.

Recompute every tick
I(R), G(θ,φ), and B(t) must all be recomputed from current drone position and wave state every tick. Never cache these values between ticks.
Exposure is permanent
E never decays, never resets — not on field exit, not between missions or engagements. Off-phase ticks pause accumulation without subtracting from E.
States are one-way
S can only increase. DISRUPTED cannot return to DEGRADED. Escaped is the only two-way state. Re-entry jumps immediately to the S-appropriate state.
Off-phase: skip, not zero
When B(t) = 0, skip the accumulation step entirely. Do not add zero to E. Do not run the state check this tick. State is frozen, not regressed.
F_match pre-condition first
Check binary pre-conditions (SATCOM link, inertial navigation) before any formula computation. If failed, skip the entire tick for this drone-wave pair.
DEW is irreversible
D_eff models physical damage and never resets. T_lock resets when lock is broken, but D_eff remains. DEW and RF accumulate independently in parallel.
Moving: volume check every tick
Re-evaluate volume membership every tick from the asset's current position. An escort vehicle driving away can trigger ESCAPED with no drone movement at all.
Resist floor = 0.01
Apply Resist = max(Resist, 0.01) before S computation every tick to prevent division by zero when V_em = 1.0.
Multi-wave: cap before accumulation
Apply the diminishing returns formula to produce I_eff_combined first, then feed that single combined value into exposure accumulation — not individual wave I_eff values.